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ABSTRACT
Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, 
or object to provisions in the statute.  Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has 
avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tool of strategic influence over judicial 
decisionmaking since the 1980s—as a way of creating “presidential legislative history” to 
supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally 
used by the courts to interpret statutes.  In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial 
opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive empirical 
examination of how courts have received presidential legislative history to date.  Three main 
findings emerge from this analysis.  First, contrary to the pervasive (and legitimate) fears in the 
literature on signing statements, courts rarely cite signing statements in their decisions.  Second, 
in the aggregate, when courts cite signing statements, they cite them in predictably partisan ways, 
with judges citing Presidents’ signing statements from their own political parties more often than 
those of the opposing parties.  This effect, however, is driven entirely by the behavior of 
Republican-appointed appellate jurists.  Third, courts predominately employ signing statements 
to buttress aligned statutory text and conventional sources of legislative history, and seemingly 
never rely on them to override contrary plain statutory text or even unified traditional legislative 
history.  This suggests that signing statements have low rank among interpretative tools and 
courts primarily use them to complement rather than substitute for congressional legislative 
history.  In this sense, Presidents have largely failed to establish an alternative corpus of valid 
interpretive material.
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INTRODUCTION 
Even as executive power creeps into nearly every domain of government affairs,1 one 
might think that legislative authority is at least unmolested in the area stamped with that branch’s 
name—legislative history.  But this would be wrong.  For the last one hundred and fifty years, 
Presidents have been issuing statements when they sign laws.2  These presidential signing 
statements have varied uses,3 but in recent decades one important objective of the statements is 
to influence how courts interpret the statute in question.  They seek, in other words, to 
presidentialize legislative history.4 
For most of this country’s history, signing statements were used sparingly, mainly for 
rhetorical purposes, praising legislation or recognizing individuals or organizations for their 
effort in the passage of a bill.5  For example, President Kennedy signed a bill on October 16, 
1962 that removed the requirement that National Science Foundation (NSF) beneficiaries sign an 
anti-Communist oath.6  Celebrating the bill, Kennedy said in a signing statement attached to the 
1. See, e.g., Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental
Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070 (2009); JOHN C. YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: A 
HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2010) (describing the growth of 
executive power, particularly in times of crisis). 
2. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23
CONST. COMM. 307, 312 (2006) (noting the historical evolution of signing statements); Christopher S. Kelley, The 
Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement 57–68 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami 
University). 
3. See infra Part II.
4. See Dellinger, infra note 10.
5. For a comprehensive history of presidential signing statements, see Kelley, supra note 2, at 57–68.
6. Statement on Signing Bill Modifying the Anti-Communist Oath Requirement for Student Loans (Oct. 16,
1962), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8968. 
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bill, “It is highly unlikely that the affidavit requirement kept any Communist out of the 
programs.  It did, however, keep out those who considered the disclaimer affidavit a bridle upon 
freedom of thought.  I am glad to approve the legislation.”7  Though it is possible to find such 
statements recently, at least since the Carter and, particularly, the Reagan Administrations, some 
signing statements have taken on a new and more assertive character.8 
The question of why Presidents issue signing statements is much debated:9 perhaps they 
represent a vehicle of public communication;10 or perhaps they represent a way of 
communicating to agencies;11 or perhaps to Congress.12  Among the rationales for signing 
statements,13 however, one has received more attention than others—that, at least recently, a 
presidential signing statement enters as part of the legislative history of the act, and thereby 
influences how courts subsequently construe the statute itself.14  By common account, this was 
indeed Attorney General Edwin Meese’s motivation for lobbying the West Publishing Company 
 
7. Id. 
8. See infra Part II.A.  So far, President Trump’s signing statements—at the time of writing, three—have 
continued in this pattern.  See Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (May 5, 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=124186; Statement on Signing the DHS Stop Asset and Vehcile 
Excess Act (June 6, 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=126288; Statement on Signing the 
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Aug. 2, 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=126763. 
9. Recently, the question of how courts should treat presidential speech has become salient.  For an excellent 
treatment of this issue, see Kate Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2981475#%23. 
10. See generally, Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Bernard M. Nussbaum, 
Counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 1993). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Bradley & Posner, supra note 2, at 312 (discussing generally the range of content contained within 
presidential signing statements). 
14. Dellinger, supra note 10. 
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in 1986 to include signing statements in the U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 
a source of legislative history commonly used by courts and legal actors.15  As Meese put it, 
doing so ensured that “the President’s own understanding of what’s in a bill is the same. . . or is 
given consideration at the same time of statutory construction later on by a court. . . so that [the 
legislative history and signing statement] can be available to the court for future construction of 
what that statute really means.”16 
Yet no study has systematically examined this common view.  This Article is the first to 
study precisely this issue: how often do courts cite to signing statements and under what 
conditions do they do so?  Some authors have argued there is limited evidence that courts cite or 
even notice signing statements.17  Other authors, however, have argued that federal courts have 
increased their citations to signing statements and thus that they may be important to judicial 
decisionmaking.18  In this way, existing evidence on this question of how often courts cite 
signing statements is fragmentary and inconclusive.  Conditional on citing a signing statement, 
we anticipate that courts treat signing statements much as they do other pieces of legislative 
history.  We suspect, in particular, that courts follow Judge Leventhal’s quip that likens the use 
 
15. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Edward H. Stiglitz, & Barry R. Weingast, Executive Opportunism, 
Presidential Signing Statements, and the Separation of Powers, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 95, 100 (2016). 
16. Dellinger, supra note 10, at 135 (quoting Meese at length) (italics added). 
17. See, e.g., T.J. HALSTEAD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 21 (Apr. 13, 2007). 
18. Kristy L. Carroll, Whose Statute is it Anyway? Why and How Courts Should Use Presidential Signing 
Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 503–04 (1997) (noting that between 1986 
and 1996, the courts cited signing statements forty-two times). 
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of legislative history to “looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends.”19  In their study 
of judges’ use of legislative history, Professors Abramowicz and Tiller, for instance, find general 
support for Leventhal’s suggestion.20  Similarly, here we expect judges to use the statements in 
an effort to justify their legal decisions when the record is sparse; or if the record is thick, 
presidential signing statements provide yet an additional layer of support to buttress a judge’s 
decision to rule in a particular way.21  Thus, in creating further legislative history, the signing 
statements may represent an important way for Presidents to enhance the probability that their 
preferred policies and interpretations are carried out by the lifetime tenured judges long after the 
President leaves office.22 
The findings from our empirical analysis support three main conclusions.23  The first 
finding is that the overall rate of citations to signing statements by appellate judges is extremely 
low.  In the Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts, there is only one citation to a signing 
statement per 7,500 non-criminal cases.24  This suggests that Attorney General Meese and the 
Reagan Administration largely failed in their objective of presidentializing legislative history.  
To the extent judges cite to legislative history in their opinions, they do so primarily to sources 
 
19. See Michael Abramowicz & Emerson Tiller, Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive 
Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision-Making, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 419 (2009) (quoting Judge 
Leventhal). 
20. Id. (demonstrating that at the appellate level, the panel composition and the broader political environment of 
the circuit can also have an effect on citation patterns). 
21. See infra Part III.A. 
22. Id. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. See Appendix. 
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that derive from Congress.25 
The second finding, however, is consistent with the findings on the use of legislative 
history generally26—in those few instances when judges cite signing statements, they tend to use 
them in a slanted way.27  In short, judges find their friends in the crowd.  Statistical tests 
demonstrate that judges often cite the signing statements of Presidents of their own party.28 
Importantly, though, this effect is asymmetric—it is entirely driven by Republican-appointed 
judges.  Democratic-appointed judges show no difference in citation behavior.29 
A third set of findings emerges from a careful survey of the cases with the most extended 
discussions of signing statements in the dataset.  In an examination of the detailed contexts in 
which courts rely on signing statements, we find that courts tend to employ signing statements as 
a gloss on statutory text or other sources of legislative history that largely align with the position 
of the statement.30  And though courts sometimes seem to give signing statements greater 
interpretive weight, as in traditional areas of executive prerogative, they also balk when the 
President expresses a view in his signing statement that is plainly contrary to the text of the 
statute or to other more conventional sources of legislative history.31  Indeed, in this analysis we 
fail to find a single example of a court using a signing statement in the manner most feared in the 
 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. E.g., Abramowicz & Tiller, supra note 19. 
27. See infra Part III.D. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. See infra Part III.E. 
31. Id. 
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literature, as an effective line item veto that overrides otherwise plain statutory language—
though that remains a conceptual possibility.32 
Overall, we find that Presidents have largely failed in the decades-long project to 
presidentialize legislative history through signing statements.33  Courts rarely cite signing 
statements.  When they do cite signing statements, they do so in predictably ideological 
manner—at least for Republicans—but they use them primarily as an additional, corroborating 
layer of “evidence,” rather than as a way to override statutory language or even other more 
conventional sources of legislative history.34 
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I we provide a typology of signing statements 
and briefly address their history in the modern presidency, highlighting the common view that 
Presidents use them to influence the judiciary.  In Part II, we then turn our attention to the 
judiciary.  We first present a theory of how signing statements provide presidential “cover” to the 
judiciary; we then probe the theory by way of data and a statistical analysis of judicial citations 
to signing statements at the appellate level; finally, we conduct a survey of the judicial opinions 
with the most in-depth discussions of signing statements to qualitatively assess how courts 
employ signing statements. 
 
32. Perhaps the closest case in this regard is Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S.Ct. 2076 (2015), infra Part III.E, but the 
evidence is at best indirect there as the Court does not cite the signing statement as an authority for its position. 
33. See infra Part III. 
34. See infra Part III.E. 
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I. PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS 
A. Typology and Descriptive Statistics 
Presidential signing statements—in contrast to proclamations, directives, speeches or 
comments about legislation—are limited to a very narrow class of presidential actions.35  For a 
position to be a signing statement, it must be a written statement that accompanies the 
President’s signature on a piece of legislation.36  It will be recorded in official documents and 
clearly linked to the legislation that it accompanies.37 
Given the wide range of subjects and objectives of presidential signing statements, 
scholars have developed varying taxonomies for studying them.38  One common method for 
classifying signing statements is to place them into three broad categories.39  The first category 
contains constitutional statements in which the President notes that certain parts of the legislation 
 
35. The president has many tools available for influencing courts: executive orders, proclamations, national 
security directives and signing statements, to name just a few, that are discussed in the literature.  See, e.g., Kelley, 
supra note 2, at 51–55.  Although beyond the scope of this Article, courts have at times cited presidents’ 
proclamations, speeches, and messages to congress.  See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 739 
(8th Cir. 2004); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 338 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 
1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1984); La. Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 540 (5th Cir. 1983). 
36. Dellinger, supra note 10. 
37. For decades, presidential signing statements have been recorded in the President’s Weekly Compilation of 
Documents and its more modern online equivalent, the President’s Daily Compilation of Documents.  See Popkin, 
infra note 54, at 700 n.4 (indicating that signing statements were included in the weekly compilation since its 
inception in 1965). 
38. Some scholars refer to rhetorical, political and constitutional statements; others prefer a simple bifurcation 
between symbolic and interpretative; others still would divide political or constitutional statements into further 
subcategories.  See Bradley & Posner, supra note 2, at 323 (acknowledging an active debate about coding 
definitions and providing an example of the impact of those disputes).  These differences have resulted in widely 
different, and arguably inaccurate, counts of presidential signing statements.  See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 2, at 44. 
39. See Dellinger, supra note 10; Rodriguez et al., supra note 15; Bradley & Posner, supra note 2. 
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are, in his view, in violation of constitutional principles.40  The second category consists of 
interpretative statements, in which the President interprets the parts of the legislation and may 
add to the “legislative history” and meaning of the statute.41  The third category is comprised of 
rhetorical or celebratory statements in which the President congratulates or celebrates 
individuals, the process, or the legislative accomplishment.42 
For example, President Obama’s first signing statement, which accompanied the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, was largely rhetorical, addressing the 
difficult economic circumstances of the time, the benefits of the legislation, and the need for 
Americans to take further action.43  In contrast, the second signing statement issued by President 
Obama, after a very brief paragraph providing context for the statement, referenced five areas of 
“constitutional concern.”44  The subsequent paragraphs include interpretations,45 concerns,46 and 
directives.47 
 
40. E.g., Rodriguez et al., supra note 15. 
41. Id.  The first category often blends into the second, as the president construes a statute precisely to avoid 
what he sees as a constitutional infirmity.  See infra notes 106–109 and accompany text for one such example. 
42. E.g., Rodriguez et al., supra note 15. 
43. Presidential Statement on Signing American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 2009 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 00088 (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85782. 
44. Presidential Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85848. 
45. Id. (noting, “I do not interpret this provision to detract from my authority to direct the heads of executive 
departments to supervise, control, and correct employees’ communications with the Congress in cases where such 
communications would be unlawful or would reveal information that is properly privileged or otherwise 
confidential.”) 
46. Id. (noting, “This provision raises constitutional concerns by constraining my choice of particular persons to 
perform specific command functions in military missions. . .”) 
47. Id. (noting that “spending decisions shall not be treated as dependent on the approval of congressional 
committees.”) 
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Our focus is on “substantive” signing statements that purport to interpret a statute, either 
on its own terms, or in light of the President’s view of constitutional principles; we exclude 
rhetorical or celebratory statements from our analysis.  Notice that this approach conflates to 
some extent the conventional “statutory” and “constitutional” designations made in the 
literature.48  For our part, the critical feature of the statement is that it construes the meaning of 
the statute.  This approach equally captures interpretations of statutes motivated by a stated 
desire to avoid a perceived constitutional infirmity, as well as interpretations motivated by non-
constitutional considerations.  In Figure 1,49 we present the data on substantive presidential 
signing statements attached to Public Laws since 1950.  As can be seen, it was in the Reagan 
Administration that there began an explosion in the number of signing statements.  Indeed, since 
the 1980s, Presidents have issued over 1,000 signing statements,50 and they appear particularly 
assertive about constitutional and interpretive issues later in their terms.51  Moreover, these 
trends hold whether there are Democrats or Republicans in office. 
 
48. See e.g., Rodriguez et al., supra note 15. 
49. This Figure is based on data developed in Rodriguez et al., supra note 15, on which Stiglitz was a co-author 
(containing details on the coding scheme and presenting similar figures). 
50. See Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. Marshall, The Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of 
Signing Statements, 38 PRES. STUD. Q. 248, 259 (2008). 
51. Id. at 264; see also Rodriguez et al., supra note 15, at 117 (observing that this pattern might result from the 
nature of legislation shifting over a president’s term). 
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Figure 1: Presidential Signing Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond the incidence of signing statements, one might also be interested in the policy 
areas in which they appear.  For instance, if signings statements only appear with respect to 
statutes dealing with foreign policy, we might not have as great concern with the President 
injecting his views into the statute—as foreign policy has long been recognized as a traditional 
area of executive control.52  But we might have a different sentiment in other policy areas, 
domestic policy, for example.  Again following Rodriguez et al.,53 we track the main policy area 
 
52. E.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE 
L.J. 231, 298 (2001). 
53. Rodriguez et al., supra note 15, at 103. 
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of each signing statement and illustrate our results in Figure 2.  For each of the most common 
policy areas of legislation, we plot the number of public laws in the area that have received 
signing statements against the proportion of public laws in that area with signing statements.  
Focusing on the proportion of public laws with signing statements, on the x-axis, foreign aid and 
defense appear among the top ten topics, both plausibly traditional areas of executive control.  
However, also appearing in the top ten topics are the environment, civil rights, housing, and 
welfare, all contentious domestic areas where congressional views take on substantial weight.  
Overall, both foreign and domestic areas populate the topics most proportionately frequented by 
signing statements. 
Figure 2: Topics of Signing Statements 
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These figures corroborate the notion that the effort to presidentialize legislative history 
has been underway since at least the 1980s.  Since that time, there has been an explosion in the 
number of signing statements issued by Presidents, only recently dipping, and these signing 
statements span a variety of issue-areas, including controversial areas of domestic policy, such as 
civil rights and the environment. 
B. The Literature: A (Mostly) Dim View 
For the most part, the literature adopts a dim view of signing statements.  The concerns 
fall, roughly, into two categories.  First, some scholars raise legal concerns largely involving 
separation of powers issues.54  Second, more recently, Stiglitz (with co-authors) raised 
institutional concerns with signing statements from the perspective of positive political theory.55  
We address these strands of the literature in turn. 
The dominant view in the legal literature is that signing statements raise serious 
separation of powers concerns.56  The fear that many have is that the President, in issuing a 
 
54. See generally, e.g., ABA, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine, Report with Recommendations (2006); Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use 
and Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 515 (2005); William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of 
Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991); Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, 
Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 363 (1987). 
55. See generally Rodriguez et al., supra note 15.  For a contrary view, see Christopher S. Yoo, Presidential 
Signing Statements, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1801 (2015). 
56. See generally Rodriguez et al., supra note 15 (using positive political theory to demonstrate the negative 
effects of signing statements, if credited by courts); Cooper, supra note 54, at 531 (arguing that signing statements 
“can and have been used as line-item vetoes of legislation presented to the president for signature or veto but 
without the use of the formal veto or the opportunity for legislative override processes.”); ABA, supra note 54, at 5 
(resolving that the ABA “oppose[s], as contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of 
  15 
signing statement, is in effect issuing a line item veto, an institutional device that the Court 
invalidated in Clinton v. City of New York.57  For example, when the President construes a clause 
in a statute to be unconstitutional and sidelines the provision in a signing statement, has he 
thereby “vetoed” an item in the statute?  And in doing so, does the President violate the 
separation of powers, trenching on legislative powers?  Such questions as these animate large 
portions of the unsettled legal literature on signing statements and raise serious concerns about 
the role of these statements.58 
Notice, however, that for the statements to raise these concerns, they have to be taken 
seriously by other institutions—agencies and, ultimately, courts, in a way that is different than 
the way these institutions would treat other forms of presidential communication, such as an 
executive order, or an ordinary memo.  As Professors Bradley and Posner aptly observe,59 the 
President may express his view about a statute through these other means without exciting 
controversy.  However, controversy attaches specifically to signing statements because—some 
fear—they, in effect, “amend” the language of the statute, changing its meaning in a way that 
these other presidential expressions cannot.  For this to happen, however, courts must credit 
signing statements with the authority to do so.  Otherwise, even if an agency takes the signing 
statement as firm instructions not to enforce some provision of the statute, the agency action at 
 
powers, the issuance of presidential signing statements that claim the authority or intention to disregard or decline to 
enforce all or part of a law the president has signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with the clear 
intent of Congress”). 
57. 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998). 
58. See, e.g., ABA, supra note 54. 
59. See generally Bradley & Posner, supra note 2, at 307. 
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issue may be set aside.  Thus, signing statements may have a privileged position via courts, or 
per Bradley and Posner, they may be difficult to distinguish from other presidential 
communications.60  Hence, our interest is in understanding how courts regard signing statements, 
specifically, and their use in legislative history, line item veto, or other force of law. 
A related concern in the literature is more institutional in nature.  The concern articulated 
in recent research is that signing statements upset the equilibrium between the executive and the 
legislature, and that, if credited by courts, signing statements will induce the legislature to 
respond in problematic ways.61  In particular, one concern is that if the President can, in effect, 
“amend” a bill after it leaves Congress, Congress will be less likely to reach agreements during 
the legislative process, because agreements made will be overturned or changed after final votes 
have been tallied.62  This will exacerbate gridlock in that branch of government.63  Congress may 
also retaliate along other problematic margins, for instance holding up confirmation on nominees 
as a form of hostage taking, or threatening to not extend the debt ceiling.64  For these institutional 
reasons, too, one might not want to see courts give credit to presidential signing statements—at 
least not more credit than they would give to a presidential speech or other less formal mode of 
communication.  This concern in the literature, too, motivates our empirical inquiry to 
understand how courts view these signing statements. 
 
60. Id. 
61. See generally Rodriguez et al., supra note 15. 
62. See id. at 96–98. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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II. THE JUDICIARY AND SIGNING STATEMENTS 
A. Empirical Predictions 
We now turn to an empirical analysis of signing statements.  The first part of this section 
contains a statistical analysis of signing statement citations of appellate and Supreme Court 
opinions.  The second part of the analysis encompasses a careful read and qualitative analysis of 
the content of “major” citations to signing statements.65  Underlying both of these analysis are 
the predictions of the legal literature as to how signing statements will be used by the judiciary. 
If the President is successful in creating presidential legislative history, one might expect 
three types of outcomes.  First, we should see courts actively, frequently, and significantly citing 
the signing statements.  If signing statements matter as pieces of legislative history, they should 
appear in judicial opinions.66 
Second, if the President is successful in altering the meaning of a statute, his gloss on the 
statute should persist well after he has left office.  Judges who share the preferences of the 
President and who hear these cases years later can turn to the presidential signing statements to 
inform their votes.  This is especially true if the President is more expert on the issue than a 
court.  The court may not know how to fully and effectively implement its own preferences.  So 
it looks for cues that presidential signing statements provide for guidance on that question—the 
 
65. See infra Part III.E. 
66. E.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845–
46 (1991) (examining the use of legislative history through extent to which courts rely on or refer to that material). 
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President, if successful, has “embedded” his view into the statute. Hence, it would be reasonable 
to expect that judges should cite presidential signing statements not only during the President’s 
term in office, but long after the President has left power. 
Third, if Presidents use signing statements to bolster their ideological agenda, and judges 
use signing statements as presidential legislative history, then one would expect judges to cite the 
presidential signing statements in ways consistent with Judge Leventhal’s famous quip.67 The 
fact that judges are ideological in decisionmaking has now been widely demonstrated in 
countless empirical studies.68  Most work examines judicial votes or decisions as evidence of this 
tendency, but other papers discuss the particular tools that judges employ to make their decision 
more ideologically aligned with their preferences.69  Presidential legislative history, one would 
expect, would fit into this larger pattern of partisan and ideological judging. 
If so, we should see judges acting ideologically with respect to how they cite signing 
statements, much as they do with respect to conventional legislative history.  That is, judges 
should be more likely to cite statements of Presidents who are of the same political affiliation as 
 
67. See Abramowitz & Tiller, supra note 19. 
68. There is a substantial literature showing that the president who appointed the judge is a good measure of a 
judge’s ideology and has substantial predictive power.  See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or 
Judicial Independence? The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor Relations, 1949–1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 
463 (1992); John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation, 
21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 501 (2005); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Richard Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). 
69. See generally Emerson Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political 
Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. ORG.  349 (1999); Frank Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial 
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 YALE L.J. 
2155 (1998); Abramovicz & Tiller, supra note 19, at 419–21. 
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the judge.  Thus, Democratic judges should cite Democratic presidential signing statements and 
Republican judges should cite Republican presidential signing statements.  We now examine 
how the empirical evidence lines up with these predictions. 
B. Data and Frequency in Citations 
To explore how the judiciary handles presidential signing statements, we developed a 
novel dataset consisting of the universe of published and unpublished decisions that had citations 
to presidential signing statements by federal appellate courts and the Supreme Court between 
1976 and 2011.  The dataset therefore focuses on the courts most likely to be influential in 
interpreting legislation, the appellate courts.70  Collecting these data was challenging because 
judges do not cite presidential signing statements in a uniform way.71  As reflected in the 
appendix, we developed a search algorithm through substantial trial and error and consultation 
with a range of legal research librarians; using Westlaw and this search algorithm, we found 
ninety-six appellate and Supreme Court opinions during this thirty-six-year period that contained 
citations to presidential signing statements.72  We believe this to be the most comprehensive 
search for appellate citations to presidential signing statements to date.  The data is informative 
 
70. The appellate courts have outsized influence by virtue of the hierarchy of the American judicial system.  
See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 
818 (1994) (observing that “longstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to follow precedent 
established by a court ‘superior’ to it”). 
71. Although there is a Bluebook citation method for presidential signing statements, few judges actually adhere 
to that format in their opinions.  See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION T1, at 243 (Columbia Law 
Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015). 
72. See infra Part V (explaining the search methods and parameters). 
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on a number of dimensions. 
The first observation about the data is foundational: there are strikingly few opinions that 
actually cite signing statements.  Despite the furor over signing statements one finds, on average, 
only 2.7 appellate or Supreme Court opinions per year that cite signing statements during this 
time period.  Given that these bodies reach judgment on some 30,000 total cases—or 20,000 
non-criminal cases—per year,73 it is remarkable that so few case opinions cite signing 
statements—indeed, only 0.0135% of all non-criminal cases include a reference to a signing 
statement, a vanishingly small fraction of the appellate docket.74  Indeed, we can further restrict 
the relevant population of cases, and the executive’s adventure into controlling legislative history 
fares little better: signing statements appear in only about 0.0289% of decisions that refer to a 
“statute” or “legislation”,75 or about 0.1629% of decisions that refer to “legislative history” and 
“statute” or “legislation.”76 
This simple finding greatly informs our view of how successful presidential legislative 
history has been.  Whatever influence signing statements exert on courts must be sharply limited, 
 
73. United States Court of Appeals, Decisions in Cases Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit and Nature of 
Proceeding, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2016 (Mar. 31, 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_b5_0331.2016.pdf 
74. That is, 2.7 divided by 20,000 gives 0.000135. 
75. We estimate the denominator by searching for “statute” in the opinions of the circuit courts and Supreme 
Court; Google Scholar estimates 332,000 such cases.  Dividing 96 by this number yields 0.000289.  GOOGLE 
SCHOLAR, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=(statute|legislation)&hl=en&as_ylo=1973&as_yhi=2011&as_sdt=fff87fe0000
000000100000000000000004 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). 
76. Google Scholar estimates 58,900 such cases over the period.  Dividing 96 by this number yields 0.001629.  
GOOGLE SCHOLAR, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%28statute%7Clegislation%29+%26+%22legislative+history%22&btnG=&hl
=en&as_sdt=fff87fe0000000000100000000000000004&as_ylo=1973&as_yhi=2011 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). 
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as fewer than 100 opinions between 1976 and 2011 cite them.  Scholars have doubted the 
influence of signing statements in earlier research,77 but until now scholars have not had a clear 
empirical portrait of the extent to which courts employ signing statements.  Judged by Edwin 
Meese’s objectives of presidentializing legislative history, the data of this Article shows signing 
statements to be an almost complete failure.  It only modestly exaggerates to say that courts 
simply do not cite presidential signing statements. 
C. Timing of Citations 
Despite the infrequency of citations to signing statements in judicial opinions, there are a 
sufficient number of citations over the thirty-six-year period to conduct a statistical analysis of 
court behavior with respect to signing statements.  Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution of 
signing statement citations by number of years elapsed between the year of the signing statement 
and the year of judicial citation to that signing statement.  An examination of the data of these 
ninety-six citations shows that the average elapsed time between signing statement issuance and 
judicial opinion is ten years, two months, with the median time being six years.  Some citing 
judicial opinions follow long after the President leaves office, such as the Pledge of Allegiance 
cases, which came roughly half a century after the signing statements at issue.78  In fact, over 
70% of the opinions citing signing statements were written after the President left office.  This 
 
77. See HALSTEAD, supra note 17. 
78. The pledge of allegiance cases cited signing statements nearly fifty years earlier.  See W. Va. St. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  Even if we trim the sample to opinions in which more than forty years have 
elapsed between statement and citation, the average elapsed time between statement and citation is seven years nine 
months with a median elapsed time of six years. 
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second finding cuts modestly against the first finding, in that it suggests that the influence 
Presidents exert through signing statements may meaningfully “embed” into the statute, touching 
the decisions of a future judiciary whose outcomes he cannot influence directly through briefs 
and oral argument in the courtroom.  In this way, presidential signing statements seem to affect 
the enduring meaning of the statute, if credited by courts. 
Figure 3: Elapsed Time from Signing Statement to Judicial Opinion Citing Signing 
Statement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Role of Ideology in Citations to Presidential Signing Statements 
Now consider how the political leanings (or ideology) of judges might influence citations 
to signing statements.  As noted earlier, the question is whether, conditional on citing signing 
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statements, judges act in ways that are predicted by the literature on judicial decisionmaking—
citing statements from Presidents of their own party more frequently than Presidents of opposing 
parties.79  We begin by measuring two variables.  The first variable, “President Party,” is the 
political party of the President who signed the statement.  The second variable, “Judge Party,” is 
the political party of the President who appointed the authoring judge who cited the signing 
statement.  Table 1 presents a cross tabulation for all citations to signing statement by the party 
of the signing President and the party of the citing judge. 
Table 1: All Citations of Presidential Signing Statements by Judge and Signing President 
Political Party (n=92)80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79. See, e.g., SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 68; Abramowitz & Tiller, supra note 69. 
80. The appendix contains citations for the cases in our database.  Four decisions were per curiam and no 
political affiliation was assigned.  See Frovola v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Eguba v.  Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998); Clevenger v. Oak Ridge School Bd., 848 F.2d 189 
(6th Cir. 1988); Johnston v. Office Pers. Mgmt., 99 F.3d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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The basic story of Table 1 is one of asymmetry.  Democratic judges appear to cite 
statements from both Democratic and Republican Presidents at roughly the same frequency. 
Republican judges, on the other hand, cite Republican signing statements almost three times 
more often than they cite Democratic signing statements.  To explore this observation using 
univariate statistical methods, we conducted simple t-tests.  The tests examines if the judges from 
one political party cite signing statements written by Presidents of their own party more than 
they cite signing statements of Presidents of opposing parties.  This hypothesis finds support 
with a t-test at the 95% level of confidence.  However, subsequent tests show this result is driven 
entirely by Republican judges.  Republican judges are more likely to cite signing statements of 
Republican Presidents than they are to cite Democratic President signing statements at the 99.9% 
level of confidence according to a simple test of means.  However, we cannot reject that 
Democratic judges cite Republican signing statements and Democratic signing statements with 
equal frequency. 
Although tabular data and univariate statistical analysis show a pattern in the data, we 
conduct a more powerful statistical analysis to control for other factors that might be explaining 
this pattern.  We examine two dependent variables.  The first dependent variable used in Model 1 
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in Table 2 is Own Citation.  Own Citation is equal to 1 if a judge is citing a presidential signing 
statement by the President of his/her own party, and equal to 0 otherwise.  The second dependent 
variable used in Model 2 in Table 2 is an indicator for whether the reference to the presidential 
signing statement is considered to be a “major” citation in the opinion, taking a 1 if so, and 0 if 
the reference is fleeting.  Under the coding scheme we employ, a citation would be characterized 
as major if it is in the body of the opinion, as opposed to a footnote, is cited alone rather than as 
part of a string citation, or is a citation that is used to support what seems to be a critical point in 
the argument of the opinion.  By comparison, citations that appear in footnotes, or in a string of 
citations, or in which the judge uses the citation to support a minor point in the argument classify 
as a minor citation.81 
A number of independent variables are used in the regression analysis.  Republican Judge 
is the party of the judge as described above, and is equal to 1 if Republican and 0 if Democratic.  
Republican Signing President is the political party of the President who signed the statement, 
and is equal to 1 if Republican and 0 if Democratic.  Republican Concurrent President is the 
political party of the President at the time of the judicial opinion citing the statement, and is 
equal to 1 if the concurrent President is Republican and 0 if the concurrent President is 
Democratic.  Time Elapsed to Decision is the number of years between the signing statement and 
the judicial opinion, as discussed earlier in the Article.82  We use a linear probability model to 
 
81. Most of these characteristics are objective coding characteristics of the citation.  Nevertheless, to avoid 
researcher bias, the research librarians and research assistants coded this variable. 
82. See supra Part III.C.  Not reported in the table—but available on request—we also include a time trend and 
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estimate the relevant relationships.83 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis.  As discussed below, Models 1–3 
present the results for the effect of the independent variables on Own Citations, and Models 4–6 
present the results for the effect of the independent variables on whether the citation is a Major 
Reference.  Both models have ninety-two observations, omitting the four per curiam decisions.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
Despite there being only ninety-two observations we obtain meaningful results.  Consider 
first Model 1.  There, we see that the coefficient on Republican Judge is positive and statistically 
significant at the 99% level.  This means that Republican judges are more likely to cite 
Republican presidential signing statements than Democratic judges are to cite Democratic 
presidential signing statements.  Indeed, the coefficient indicates that Republican judges are 
thirty percentage points more likely to cite Republican signing statements than Democratic 
judges are to cite Democratic signing statements.  This is both statistically significant and 
substantively very large, especially given this sample’s small size.  This is one of the main 
statistical findings of this Article and lends credibility to the notion that Republican-appointed 
judges are particularly prone to seek out “friends” when citing signing statements. 
Model 1 also shows that as more time elapses between the signing statement and the 
 
the square of the time trend in some of the specifications; the table identifies the specifications with this feature. 
83. We have also analyzed the data using a random effects probit model using random effects for judges or 
random effects for circuits.  David K. Guilkey & James L. Murphy, Estimation and Testing in the Random Effects 
Probit Model, 59 J. ECONOMETRICS 301 (1993).  The results from analyzing that model do not differ qualitatively 
from those reported for the linear probability model in this body of the Article; we will make those results available 
on request.  We opt for the simpler linear probability model due to its transparency and ease of interpretation. 
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judicial opinion that cites the statement, judges are less likely to cite their own party’s statement 
and are more likely to cross party lines in citations.  These latter results are consistent with the 
idea that presidential-judicial politics has become more partisan with the passage of time.  It is 
also consistent with the argument that there is ideological drift of political parties over time. 
In Models 2 and 3, we add time trends (Model 2) and circuit fixed effects (Model 3).  The 
time trends should capture any (quadratic) trend in the tendency of judges to cite signing 
statements of their own parties over time—for example, if citation culture changes over time. 
The circuit fixed effects absorb any time-invariant feature of the circuits with respect to citation 
practices—for instance, it may be that some circuits have an idiosyncratic culture of citing 
Republican signing statements, quite apart from the fact that Republican judges also sit on the 
circuit.  The fixed effects allow us to examine how citation behavior varies within circuits.  
These two sets of additional checks, however, do little to change the core substantive results.  In 
Model 3, which is the most demanding specification and features both time trends and circuit 
fixed effects, the magnitude of the coefficient on Republican Judge attenuates somewhat, but 
remains large and statistically significant, implying that Republican judges are about twenty-
three percentage points more likely to cite statements of their own party than Democratic 
judges.84 
 
 
84. That is, the coefficient is 0.229; this suggests an effect of the magnitude noted in the text.  In this 
specification, the coefficient on Time Elapsed to Decision also attenuates to the point that it is no longer statistically 
significant. 
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Table 2: The Effect of Political Ideology on Judicial Citations to Signing Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ‘ 90 percent level statistical significance; ** 99 percent level statistical significance.  Own Citation is the 
dependent variable in models 1–3 and takes a 1 if the judge is citing a presidential signing statement by the President 
of his or her own party and a 0 otherwise.  Major Reference is the dependent variable in models 4–6 and takes a 1 if 
the reference to the signing statement is considered “major” and 0 otherwise. 
 
Now consider Model 4, which focuses on the ability to predict “major” references to 
signing statements in judicial opinions.  No coefficient in the regression is statistically significant 
at the 90% level or above, meaning that the independent variables we examine do a poor job at 
predicting major versus minor citations to signing statements.  Adding time trends and circuit 
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fixed effects does not change this pattern. 
In summary, Table 2 shows that there is a partisan divide in judicial behavior on the 
citation of presidential signing statements, with Republicans judges citing own party statements 
with much higher frequency than Democrats.  In addition, coefficients on control variables 
suggest that judges are more willing to cross party lines to cite opposing party signing statements 
as time elapses between signing statements and opinions.  Finally, there seem to be few, if any, 
predictors of the type of citation, major or minor, judges will employ. 
Combining the findings from this statistical exercise, we see a regular pattern in the data. 
Courts rarely cite signing statements.  When courts do cite them, it is usually after the signing 
President has left office.  We also find evidence that Republican judges tend to favor signing 
statements issued by Presidents of their own party.  This conforms to searching for one’s friends, 
and to the more general findings in the literature on the strategic use of citations.  But we do not 
find the symmetrical finding for Democratic judges—they seem to cite signing statements issued 
by Presidents of both parties about equally. 
E. Major Statutory and Constitutional Citations to Signing Statements 
The quantitative analysis in the previous section provided essential insight into the 
statistical regularities of when judges cite signing statements.  To supplement this quantitative 
analysis, we also carefully read the cases involving major citations to signing statements to 
examine how courts use them.  This investigation generates several conclusions.  The most 
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general conclusion is that, even when courts cite signing statements, they do not use them to 
override clear statutory text or even more conventional sources of legislative history, such as 
committee reports.  Contrary to the greatest fears of some legal scholars, courts do not appear to 
use signing statements as an effective line item veto.85  Still, courts do seem to credit signing 
statements in some contexts and to definitely reject them in others, as discussed below. 
Perhaps most commonly, courts appear to use signing statements to buttress their 
interpretation of a statute when the text itself is not entirely plain and the other conventional 
sources of legislative history are not contrary to the statement.  In this regard, United States v. 
Fisher is characteristic.86  There, the issue was whether Congress had designated the Florida 
Keys as a marine sanctuary in the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and Protection Act, 
thereby displacing the full set of more general procedures for such designations set forth in the 
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (Sanctuaries Act).87  The court concluded that 
Congress had done so, in part relying on statutory text, which provided that the Keys “should be 
treated as if it ‘had been designated’ under the Sanctuaries Act,” and in part based on President 
H.W. Bush’s signing statement, which remarked that Congress had “bypassed” the procedures of 
the Sanctuary Act.88  In this case, as in perhaps the modal signing statement case, there is no 
evident conflict between the statement and statutory text or other sources of legislative history. 
 
85. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 54, at 531.  It is possible, of course, that agencies do regard signing statements 
as effectively containing line item vetoes.  If so, courts might never be in a position to review the agency action and 
that interpretation of the statute would not be in our dataset. 
86. 22 F.3d 262 (11th Cir. 1991). 
87. Id. at 265–69. 
88. Id. at 268–69. 
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Nevertheless, the court laces the language of the statement into the opinion for support.89  In 
these cases, the President is successful, though by inches and not yards, in presidentializing 
legislative history with signing statements. 
It would be misleading, however, to completely dismiss signing statements as always 
inch movements of the ball.  In our dataset, signing statements seem to have the most force in 
two scenarios.  The first occurs when the statute is unclear and other sources of legislative 
history themselves conflict.  For instance in United States v. Story,90 the court considered the 
relationship between “straddle crimes” and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and its various 
amendments, which provided sentencing guidelines as well as an effective date for those 
guidelines.91  So-called straddle crimes began before the guidelines went into effect, and 
continued until after they went into effect, giving rise to the question of whether the guidelines 
applied to sentencing decisions for such crimes.92  The House and the Senate apparently reached 
different interpretations of the statute on this question.  On the House side, citing concerns over 
the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution, Representative Conyers entered an analysis 
into the Congressional Record indicating that the guidelines would not apply to straddle crimes.93 
By contrast, on the Senate side, Senator Biden entered a contrary analysis, which viewed the 
 
89. For other cases along this line, see, for example, Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Ventre, 338 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2003); Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Love v. 
Morton, 112 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 1997). 
90. 891 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1989). 
91. For a similar use of a signing statement, see, for example, United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
92. Story, 891 F.2d at 990–91. 
93. Id. at 992–93. 
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guidelines as reaching straddle crimes.94  The court adopted the Senate view on the question, 
citing to President Reagan’s signing statement, which plainly favored the Senate perspective.95  
Though there is “room for doubt as to the weight to be accorded a presidential signing 
statement,” the court hedged, in this case the statement is “significant” as the President 
“participated in the negotiation of the compromise legislation.”96 
The other scenario in which signing statements plausibly have some force is in traditional 
areas of executive prerogative, foreign policy and national security.  The most recent and high 
profile example in this regard is Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State,97 where the D.C. Circuit, and 
later the Supreme Court,98 sided with the President’s view on a constitutional matter, over the 
clear language of the statute.99  At issue in that case was § 214(d) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, which required the State Department to list “Israel” as the 
place of birth in passports for U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem.100  This statutory requirement 
threatened to upset the United States’ longstanding policy of studied ambiguity on the status of 
Jerusalem.101  President W. Bush observed in his signing statement that of the 2003 Act, if § 
214(d) is read as mandatory rather than advisory, it would “impermissibly interfere with the 
President’s constitutional authority to formulate the position of the United States, speak for the 
 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 993. 
96. Id. at 994. 
97. 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
98. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
99. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2076; Zivotofsky 571 F.3d at 1227. 
100. 571 F.3d at 1228–29. 
101. Id. at 1229. 
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Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign 
states.  U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem has not changed.”102  The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court on subsequent review,103 concluded that § 214(d) was unconstitutional, violating the 
exclusive power to recognize other states vested in the President.104  Though the Court did not 
explicitly rely on President Bush’s signing statement as a constitutional authority—doing so 
would have been extraordinary—and it impossible to show how much influence the signing 
statement had, it is notable that the Court cited it and adopted the same theory of the Constitution 
expressed in it, effectuating a constitutional veto of clear statutory text.105 
Even as courts thus seem to credit signing statements in some contexts—with divided 
legislative history or in foreign affairs—they also disavow the influence of signing statements in 
others.  For example, President Reagan attempted an effective line item veto of certain 
procedures that Congress established for procurements in the Competition in Contracting Act of 
1984, arguing that the procedures trenched on his “executive” powers.106  As President Reagan 
wrote in his statement, “I must vigorously object to certain provisions that would 
unconstitutionally attempt to delegate to the Comptroller General of the United States, an officer 
of Congress, the power to perform duties and responsibilities that in our constitutional system 
 
102. Id. at 1229. 
103. 135 S. Ct. at 2076; Zivotofsky 571 F.3d at 1227. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 2082. 
106. Lear Sigler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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may be performed only by officials of the executive branch.”107  The President then instructed 
the Attorney General to advise executive agencies on how to comply with his constitutionally 
informed view of the Act.108  The court emphatically rejected these moves by the President: 
Art. I, § 7 [of the U.S. Constitution] does not empower the President to revise a bill, 
either before or after signing.  It does not empower the President to employ a so-called ‘line 
item veto’ and excise or sever provisions of a bill with which he disagrees.  The only 
constitutionally prescribed means for the President to effectuate his objections to a bill is to 
veto it and to state those objections upon returning the bill to Congress.109 
In this way, the court refused to credit a signing statement that attempted to override clear 
statutory text.110  Courts adopt much the same posture with respect to signing statements when 
they run contrary to a unified legislative history emanating from more conventional sources.  In 
Taylor v. Heckler,111 for instance, the court considered the Equal Access to Justice Act, which 
entitles a party prevailing against the United States to reasonable fees and costs in certain 
circumstances.112  However, under the Act, if a court finds the position of the United States to be 
 
107. Id. at 1119. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1124. 
110. Although an analysis of veto statements is outside the scope of the Article, courts do cite veto statements in 
their opinions.  See Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Gersman v. Grp. Health Ass’n, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  Such an analysis would be worthy of future research.  We have had discussions 
with Professor William Eskridge about this precise topic. 
111. 835 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1987). 
112. Id. at 1039. 
  35 
“substantially justified,” the prevailing party would not be entitled to such fees and costs.113  A 
question the court confronted was whether an agency action that was set aside as arbitrary and 
capricious—or as failing the substantial evidence test—under the Administrative Procedure Act 
could nonetheless be substantially justified, thereby barring fees and costs to the prevailing 
party.114  The court noted legislative materials from the House, which suggested that an agency 
action set aside as arbitrary and capricious was “virtually certain” to not be substantially 
justified, but backed off from any “per se” equivalence of the two standards of review.115  
Critically, however, the court also pointedly rejected a sharp distinction between the standards, 
as President Reagan called for in his signing statement.116  In particular, President Reagan 
declared that, “The substantial justification standard is a different standard, and an easier one to 
meet, than either the arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence standard.  A separate 
inquiry is [therefore] required.”117  Without determining what weight to give the signing 
statement, the court observed that “[t]his statement of executive intent is, we believe, largely 
inconsistent with the legislative history,”118 and sidelined it on the grounds that circuit precedent 
on this question focused on the House Report that largely aligned the two standards.119 
In sum, courts seem to adopt three basic postures with respect to signing statements 
 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1039–40. 
115. Id. at 1044. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1044 n.17 (alteration in original). 
118. Id. 
119. For another case along these lines, see In re Unimet Corp., 842 F.2d 879, 885 n.6 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(chastising the district court for using a signing statement). 
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depending on the context.  The most common position, it seems, involves using the statement as 
supplemental gloss on statutory text or conventional sources of legislative history, where the 
statement does not conflict with the text or those other sources.  Signing statements seem 
somewhat more influential when they touch on constitutional questions in areas of traditional 
executive prerogative, as plausibly in Zivotofsky, or when the statutory text and other sources of 
legislative history are fragmentary or contradictory.  In such contexts, the position advanced in 
the signing statements may carry the day, even if courts shy from explicitly relying on them as 
interpretative authority.  Finally, courts seem distinctly unwilling to credit signing statements if 
they contradict with clear statutory language or a unified (conventional) legislative history, with 
only the hedging footnote of the Zivotofsky.  Most importantly, courts have not casually used 
signing statements as effective line item vetoes by the President. 
CONCLUSION 
The headline story of (at least) the last four decades of constitutional and administrative 
law is one of the seemingly unstoppable growth of executive authority.  Here, we have examined 
one of the few areas where the executive has tried and largely failed to exert authority: legislative 
history.120  Despite the explicit efforts of the Reagan Administration and Edwin Meese, signing 
statements have not entered the canon of legislative history and statutory construction.121 
 
120. The Executive has lost along other margins, too, though these losses work against the main current.  For 
example, the failure of the executive to win the battle over the Independent Counsel, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654 (1988), represents another rare loss for the branch of government. 
121. Bradley & Posner, supra note 13, at 316. 
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The question of why this project failed is of great interest, and we can only speculate. 
One view is that the conservative assault on statutory interpretation proceeded along two tracks. 
The first, the one we examine here, was to change how courts view legislative history.  This 
track largely failed.  The second was even more ambitious: to shift interpretive methodology 
entirely away from legislative history to more favorable ground—that is, to focus judicial 
attention on statutory text rather than purposes and legislative history.  This second track has to a 
large extent succeeded.  Courts now generally appear less willing to credit legislative history, 
whatever the source.122 
That said, in those rare instances where courts do engage with signing statements, Meese 
appears more successful.  Judges otherwise sympathetic with the President use signing 
statements to bolster their arguments, even long after the signing President has left office.  To us, 
this suggests that signing statements have potential force in our judicial system—judges at times 
seem drawn to sympathetic interpretative material.  Should courts begin to pursue legislative 
purposes and use legislative history more freely, signing statements may again become a highly 
contested battleground.123 
This pattern stresses the normative issue of whether courts should use signing statements. 
Though not our focus here, other work has argued that—given separation of powers dynamics of 
 
122. See, e.g., James J. Brundey & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?, 89 
JUDICATURE 220 (2005–2006). 
123. We see some signs that courts may be moving in this direction, as in King v. Burwell, where the Court 
considered the “context” of the statute, or in the dagger-words of Scalia’s dissent, the “design and purpose” of the 
statute.  See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489, 2502 (2015). 
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the legislative and executive branches of government—courts should not rely upon signing 
statements for legislative history.124  If the President is able to presidentialize legislative history, 
our country will likely suffer even greater breakdown in the machinery of democratic self-
governance.125 
APPENDIX: CREATING THE SIGNING STATEMENTS CITATION DATABASE 
Creating a comprehensive list of judicial opinions which cite signing statements is a 
difficult task.  Unable to locate an existing database of signing statement opinions in the 
literature, we searched for relevant cases using the standard Bluebook citation method for 
signing statements.126  This search did not produce comprehensive results because federal 
appeals courts and U.S. Supreme Court judges often deviated from the prescribed citation 
format. 
We found numerous ways in which presidential signing statements are referenced in 
judicial opinions, including for example “statement of ____ upon signing,”127 “weekly 
compilation of presidential documents,”128 “presidential statement on signing,”129 “president’s 
remarks on signing,”130 “remarks on signing.”131 
 
124. Rodriguez et al., supra note 15, at 113. 
125. Id. 
126. BLUEBOOK, supra note 71, at T1.2, p. 244. 
127. See, e.g., Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 477 n.8 (9th Cir. 1993). 
128. See, e.g., Love v. Morton, 112 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1997). 
129. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 211 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated 131 S.Ct. 2958 (2011). 
130. See, e.g., United States v. Abdullah, 520 F.3d 890, 895 (8th Cir. 2008). 
131. Id. 
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Working with legal research librarians, we triangulated on four simple Boolean searches 
in Westlaw using president! /s sign! /s statement, statement /s signing /s “pub. L”, statement /s 
signing /s S, and President /s signing/s H.R..  This sequence produced eighty-four cases.  We ran 
an additional search using ((president! /s (message remarks statement) /s (signing regarding) 
((weekly daily /s comp! /s pres!) /p (signing regarding)) & date (aft 1975), which located an 
additional twelve relevant cases.  In total, after screening the cases, we located ninety-six cases 
over the examined thirty-six-year time period. 
A comprehensive set of court opinions in which the author cites to a presidential signing 
statement is a difficult task, and we cannot ensure that our dataset does not omit relevant 
opinions.  It is possible that our searches omit citations that follow a non-standard format or 
otherwise contain errors in formatting.  Notwithstanding this limitation, we are reasonably 
certain there is no standard citation method for signing statements we have missed.  We also 
believe that there is not a systematic bias in any missing cases. 
 
The list of the cases with opinions citing signing statements is below. 
 
100 F.3d 691 311 F.3d 440 66 F.3d 569  
105 F.3d 1063 313 F.3d 620 672 F.2d 252  
110 F.3d 1562 322 F.3d 1039 673 F.2d 425  
  40 
110 F.3d 210 333 F.3d 228 733 F.2d 1343  
110 F.3d 873 338 F.3d 1047 741 F.2d 401 
112 F.3d 131 344 F.3d 1161 761 F.2d 370 
115 S. Ct. 1624  345 F.3d 742  797 F.2d 1164  
119 S. Ct. 765 352 F.3d 695 812 F.2d 1133 
130 S. Ct. 3138 391 F.3d 120 824 F.2d 923  
130 S. Ct. 1577 439 F.3d 1149 835 F.2d 1037 
133 F.3d 783 444 F.3d 614 835 F.2d 1037 
144 F.3d 1182 459 F.3d 1 842 F.2d 1102 
153 F.3d 184 460 F.3d 337 842 F.2d 879 
155 F.3d 189 462 U.S. 919 848 F.2d 189 
156 Fed. App’x.  478 U.S. 714 871 F.2d 265 
169 F.3d 820 503 F.3d 1266  878 F.2d 1163 
180 F.3d 1081 508 F.3d 1261 880 F.2d 636  
181 F.3d 478 520 F.3d 890  89 F.3d 1523  
2 F.3d 1342  547 F.2d 673 891 F.2d 988 
206 F.3d 1212 548 U.S. 557 892 F.2d 691 
216 F.3d 354 555 F.2d 771 90 F.3d 302 
22 F.3d 262  565 F.2d 1172 903 F.2d 1478 
  41 
228 F.3d 1105 571 F.3d 1227 933 F.2d 477 
238 F.3d 1090 576 F.3d 37 947 F.2d 660 
24 F.3d 1  580 F.3d 1 95 F.3d 999 
240 F.3d 1019 597 F.3d 1007 96 F.3d 856 
275 F.3d 490 6 F.3d 821 960 F.2d 1370 
292 F.3d 597 618 F.3d 300 962 F. 2d 234 
299 F.3d 1273 620 F.3d 170  985 F.2d 470  
302 F.3d 161 647 F.2d 320  99 F.3d 1160 
303 F.3d 994 654 F.3d 11 990 F.2d 1397  
310 F.3d 1188 654 F.3d 919  992 F.2d 1359 
 
 
